Setting the Scene
European integration is a fuzzy term comprising a wide variety of socio-politica1 elements, geographical settings and institutional-economie mechanisms. The European Union has originated from an uncoordinated patchwork of different driving forces, missing networks and self-centred regulatory regimes. The pace towards more coordinated polities, for instance, in the area of a common agricultural policy (CAP) or a common transport policy (CTP), has been long lasting and sometimes fi-ustrating. Nevertheless, Europe is gradually shaping its own politica1 face, a development that urgently needs to take place in the light of the foreseen entry of the accession countries (see also
Commission of the European Communities 2001).
One of the policy areas in which the European Commission has been active is transportation policy. Policy development in this area is govemed by two genera1 principles laid down in the Treaty One of the foundation stones of the CTP is to introduce more market orientation in the transportation sector in order to increase the efficiency in this rather old-fashioned system. Various mechanisms based on policy devolution are at present envisaged, in particular decentralisation, deregulation and privatisation. Through a strong adherente to market principles the transport sector is expected to offer an effective contribution to an efficiency rise in the European unification process.
Such a policy is not only needed for cross-border transportation (e.g., the railway sector, the aviation sector or intemational freight transport), but also for public transport at various geographical scales ranging fiom interregional to local transport. The European Commission is at present developing a comprehensive framework of appropriate regulations and financial incentives in order to favour the performance of public transport with the help of market incentives. From the three possible idealtypical organization forms of public transport, viz. a public monopoly with closed markets, a system of limited competition and a system of entirely deregulated markets, the Commission supports a fiamework based on limited competition.
The present study aims to test whether the gradual transition towards a system of limited competition for urban public transport (or urban mass transit) has been successful in terms of a better achievement of the targets set by the public transport authorities. In addition, the study aims to identify the critical success factors for the achievement of the success (or the lack of success) of public transport systems in various urban regions in Europe based on both a taxonomie interpretation and a meta-analytic comparison.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a concise introduction into European policy on (urban) public transport is offered; particular attention wil1 be given to various policy objectives which serve as a frame of reference for judging the actual achievement of urban public transport systems.
Next, we wil1 offer an overview of various organizational forms of urban public transport systems in Section 3. As a step towards a practica1 policy analysis Section 4 wil1 map out the various critical success factors for these achievements. In Section 5 the data base for our taxonomie analysis of various European urban public transport systems wil1 be presented. A substantive interpretation of empirical findings and results of a more rigorous analytical method for handling smal1 sample qualitative data in comparative case study research, viz. rough set analysis, based on meta-analytical principles, are contained in Section 6; the resulting policy rules wil1 be interpreted as well. And finally, the paper wil1 be concluded with some policy perspectives.
Basic Elements of European Urban Public Transport Policy
Transport is one of the connecting principles of European integration policy (see Nijkamp et al. 1998 ). This applies to al1 geographical levels ranging from intemational to local. For example, at the intemational level, the policy on Trans European Networks (TENs) is of utmost importante. At the local level, the EU competente regarding the operation of local networks is limited by the abovementioned principles of proportionality and subsidiarity, but the genera1 objective of favouring efficiency in European transport systems applies here as well, beside the tùlfilment of socio-economie objectives (such as employment generation) and environmental objectives (e.g., reduction in COZ emissions in the transport sector).
Urban transport is generally seen as a public service of great importante. At the individual leve1 it is a service that meets the needs of mobile citizens, while at a societal leve1 it contributes to quality of life and sustainability. The EU directorate-genera1 on Transport has even positioned public transport as a crucial service for European citizens (see DG Transport 1996) , witness the following statements: Clearly, a major weak element in the provision of high quality urban and suburban public transport is the low transparancy in the organization of European public transport. The organizational models range from public enterprises (with a dominant role of public authorities in ownership, planning and operation) to private enterprises in deregulated markets. Public monopolies have become notoriously inefficiently operating firms due to lack of incentives in a protected market. Privately organized firms in the public transport market are assumed to operate much more efficiently, but this efficiency rise may be offset by a loss in terms of integration of public transport systems (see also Van Ooststroom 1998) . Consequently, the European Commission has formulated a blend of these two extreme forms that might offer a better compliance with the needs of both citizens and society at large.
This organizational mix presupposes a light regulation, which may favour the achievement of production efficiency, tost efficiency, socio-economie objectives and client orientation.
The semi-market model advocated by the Commission is based on a system of concessions to be granted on a competitive basis by responsible public authorities to various public transport operators.
The regulatory and operational framework of the services to be offered has to be specified by the public authority. This model has two major consequences. First, it leads to a shift in the mission of a public transport operator from a duty to deliver a service toward the establishment of a contract between two parties, viz. the public authority and the operator, so that the two roles cannot coincide anymore. Clearly, in the accompanying legal framework the rights and duties of both parties (e.g., geographical coverage of the transport service, frequency and tariff structure) have to be specified. In the second place, the concession model introduces clearly market incentives, as a concession has only a limited time span and a new concession is subject to a cal1 for tender. These objectives would,stimulate a strong public transport sector in Europe and eliminate existing barriers that induce inefficiencies. The operationalisation of the above principles at a local scale is mainly a responsibility of public authorities at a local or regional level.
Another possible govemment intervention in the public transport sector may be based on the provision of subsidies or loans, from either the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) or the Cohesion Fund (CF). Financial means from the ERDF can be obtained in order to stimulate small-and medium-size enterprise activities, to favour generally productive investments, to improve weak infiastructures or to entourage local development. Support from the CF serves to favour socio-economie integration in Europe, inter alia for the improvement of accessibility or connectivity to the TENs.
The Organization of Local Public Transport Systems
Local public transport (LPT) systems -in EU countries and world-wide -exhibit an enormous variety of appearances in terms of organization and relationships with stakeholders, as wel1 as of planning and control systems. In the framework of our study we wil1 deploy a practica1 classifïcation of LPT systems on the basis of the 'right of initiutive ', where the fundamental and legal decision on how to organize an LPT system rests either with a public authority or with the market. In the first case, the transport authority has a forma1 monopoly, whereas in the second case LPT initiatives originate from the -often anonymous -free market system (though restricted by legislation and regulatory measures). Figure 1 offers a systematic tûrther distinction of the possible organizational structures of the above major classification.
The LPT system is usually operating in a complex force field with several key players. In our taxonomie approach we make the following distinction: The parties involved with LPT systems (i.e., A, C, K, 0) execute different roles and functions on the market for collective passenger transport. In particular, the following activities and tasks can be distinguished:
-supply (delivery) of LPT services to clients (D)
-payment for LPT service provision (P) -democratie (voting) impact on quality and quantity of LPT services or systems (V) -public regulation of supply andor demand of LPT services (R).
The execution of these tasks and roles brings the four above-mentioned parties together, as these items make up the linking pins between the parties concemed. The linkage structure between these four classes of stakeholders can now schematically be mapped out using a connectivity matrix (see Figure   2 ). In an ideal-typical form this constellation can also be represented as follows (see Figure 4) . 
Success Factors of LPT Systems
To increase the use and efficiency in LPT systems it is necessary to gain more insight into the driving forces or determinants of the performance of such systems. Base on the various EU directives referred to above, a subdivision may be made into two classes of objectives. First, there are socioeconomie performance criteria, in particular, the increase in the use of LPT systems, an improvement in environmental quality conditions or a contribution to employment. In this framework, one may also mention accessibility, quality, availability and affordability of LPT services. In the second place, there are financial-economie performance criteria, in particular intemal tost-efficiency and customeroriented effectiveness. This complex set of interlinked objectives/criteria for the functioning of LPT systems is depicted in Figure 5 . Clearly, the actual fulfilment of such policy goals would have to be 'explained' from a set of generic and site-specific background factors. The main indicator for policy success is the usage of local mass transit systems, which is a composite indicator of many underlying policy-relevant criteria as described in Figure 5 .
The performance of LPT systems is thus critically contingent upon a set of major driving forces We wil1 concisely describe these 4 CSCs. These factors cannot be controlled by the LPT agency concemed. We wil1 distinguish here 3 major extemal CSCs:
Al. population. This factor refers to the potential demand for LPT services and represents also an efficiency indicator in relation to the critical mass of LPT users (including also the population fi-om adjacent areas as wel1 as tourists).
A2. population densiq. This factor is a proxy for the economies of geographical density and influences the type of LPT systems offered.
A3. population distribution. This factor refers in particular to the degree of uniformity or heterogeneity in the geographical dispersion of people (e.g., a poly-nuclear structure versus an urban-rural dichotomy).
A4
. incidental large urban manifestations. Large urban manifestations such as exhibitions, sports events or cultural events exert a significant but ad hoc impact on the performance of LPT systems.
B. Strategie CSCs
The goals of LPT systems are also influenced by strategie factors determined by the various stakeholders, in particular national, regional and local authorities. The strategie factors distinguished here are: B 1. politica1 interest. In both publicly organized and market-oriented LPT systems public authorities have a significant impact on the functioning of LPT systems through both regulating and facilitating interventions.
B2. speczjìc LPT regulutions. Within the EU context of subsidiarity and proportionality many initiatives have been developed which aim to improve the efficiency in the LPT sector.
Regulatory uncertainty may have a negative impact on the LPT performance.
B3. integrated LPT and urban development. Urban and suburban development plans need to be
supported by suffïcient availability of LPT systems. Such an integration needs to be realized on both a structural and a project basis in order to attract suffícient demand.
B4. coordination between LPT sector and public authorities. In this framework various tasks play a role, such as granting concessions, evaluation of licences by a responsible public authority, provision of subsidies etc.
C. Tactical CSCs
The tactical leve1 addresses the question how genera1 objectives can be converted into an actual implementation of LPT services. The following categories can be distinguished:
Cl. orgunizational frumework. The organizational constellation refers in particular to the right of initiative as spelt out in Figure 1 .
C2. financiul fiamework. The financial ramification is concemed with fïnancial aspects of various
LPT tasks including the contractual aspects (e.g., management contract, gross tost contract, net tost contract).
C3. subsidies. These forms of financial support comprise both structural and non-structural subsidies.
The latter category concerns fïnancial assistance for ad hoc projects. Structural subsidies can be subdivided into direct and indirect subsidies. Direct subsidies mean a transfer to the LPT operator, while indirect subsidies mean a financial support via the user. Also cross-subsidisation between various public services or LPT services is possible.
C4. private-public partnership.
This type of co-operation between the public sector and the private sector may relate to both the operational execution of LPT services and the operation of LPT infrastructure projects. The motives for this co-operative mode are inter alia: benefits from synergy, multifunctional development, blend of regulatory and business culture, better coverage of market risks etc.
C5. symbiosis between LPT and other transport modes, A better integration may generate win-win
situations, e.g., in case of multi-modal passenger terminals.
D. Operational CSCs
At the operational leve1 we address the actual supply and execution of LPT services, in particular production and sales activities. The following factors can be distinguished here:
Dl. variety in supply of LPT services. Relevant categories are inter alia: bus, tram, metro, train, people mover etc.
D2. privilegedposition of LPT compared to other traffic. Priority rules for LPT may offer this system a more competitive position.
D3. den@ of LPT.
Density may refer to both the service (e.g., frequency and intensity) and the infrastructure.
D4. integration of LPT.
The various LPT systems may have a higher degree of cohesion through the integration of fares, logistics, routing etc.
D5. LPT marketing and information.
This factor refers to the need for market and client orientation of a modern LPT sector.
These CSCs wil1 now be used as a test framework for a comparative analysis of LPT systems in various European cities.
Creation of the Data Base on LPT Systems in European Cities
The classification of the CSCs discussed in the previous section needs a further operationalisation by indicating to which extent the various LPT objectives and CSCs are realised in each of the European cities investigated in our study. The European case cities selected in our study cover a wide range of urban size categories and of organizational/regulatory frameworks and offer a representative cross-section of different urban public transport constellations. This wil1 allow a comparison of both urban regions of similar sizes but functioning under different arrangements and of urban regions of various sizes but functioning under similar arrangements (cf. also Yin 1994) . The following cities were ultimately chosen (see Table 1 ). For each city in this list the set of performance (success) indicators included in Figure 5 has been assessed in a qualitative (categorical) form by using local expert information (see for details Van Egmond 2001) . These scores are based on the degree of fulfïlment of objectives included in Figure 5 .
The centra1 objective is usage of urban mass transit systems, as a result of the various background factors included in this figure. An expert summation of al1 these individual performance criteria may then lead to a comprehensive score for the LPT success according to the following trichotomic classification of the performance of a given LPT system in any of these cities: successful (score 1); moderately succes&1 (score 2); unsuccessful (score 3); unknown success receives a code 4. The actual performance assessments based on reports, articles, yearbooks, research, intemet and casual interviews can be found in the first row (P) of Table 3 .
To map out in a categorical form the CSCs for each city a codilïed qualitative information table has to be deployed (see Table 2 .). Next, empirical estimates of al1 18 factors determining the CSCs have been made for al1 22 European case cities, again based on various local information sources on LPT. With the help of extensive comparative fieldwork the codification included in Table 2 has been assessed for each individual city. The empirically estimated information is contained in Table 3 under the headings A through D. The information in the latter table wil1 now be treated in two steps. First, we wil1 offer a qualitative interpretation of the results, based on an analysis of frequenties of CSCs in this matrix. Next, we wil1 deploy a new multivariate classifïcation method for nomina1 measurement scales, coined rough set analysis.
Empirical Results
A qualitative inspection of the coded data matrix (Table 3 ) offers already quite some interesting insights. The performance scores in Table 3 demonstrate that from our sample of 22 European cities at least 5 cities are regarded as having an unsuccessful operation of their LPT systems. A moderate success is claimed by 9 cities, while a good performance can apparently be found in 7 cities. For one city the performance of its LPT systems could not be unambiguously defined. So the genera1 fïnding is that the present conditions of a European policy of limited competition has led to rather successful outcomes, since a total of 16 cities out of 22 cases has moderately to high successful LPT systems (measured in terms of an increase in the use of LPT).
From the set of 22 cities a total of 16 may be considered as cases of limited competition, the dominant organizational form of EU LPT systems. From these 16 cases, a total of 10 may be interpreted as based on initiative by the public authority, while the remaining ones represent an initiative by the market (or an ambiguous case). In general, these cases appear to yield rather promising results. Thus, one may conclude that the adoption of a specific organizational-institutional form of LPT based on limited competition provides the conditions for a balance between the sociopolitica1 objectives of sound socio-economie and financial-economie development of LPT systems.
If we make a distinction into extemal, strategie, tactical and operational background conditions for the performance of LPT systems, then we arrive at the following genera1 conclusion on their impact on the LPT performance. D2  12  13  13  2  3  3  3  3  3  32  13  12  3  11  3   D3  2  2  12  3  2  2  11  2  2  12  4  2  14  11  2  2  2   D4   3  11  2  3  1111  2  12  2  3  3  2  1  1  1  2  1  1   D5  2  12  3  3  4  3  2  12  4  13  2  3  2  4  14  14  2   Table 3 . The coded data base on performance (P) and CSCs (A, B, C, D) of European LPT systems
The external factors do not appear to exert an unambiguous impact on the success scores of LPT.
Although these are some clear links with some of the constituents of the external factors, the overall result is inconclusive.
For the strategie factors we observe a more straightforward influence on the success score of LPT.
In particular, the quality of govemance and management appears to be a decisive positive factor (e.g.,
for Bern and Paris). On the other hand, overorganization of the LPT Systems leads most likely to a failure.
At the tuctical leve1 we also observe interesting fïndings. In particular, cities with an LPT system govemed by regulated or limited competition appear to yield a good performance. This should also be reflected in a sound division of financial responsibilities of al1 stakeholders, especially in the context of a gross tost contract or a clear management contract. Furthermore, it appears that high subsidies for LPT systems lead to an unsatisfactory fïnancial and socio-economie performance, while moderate subsidies appear to yield in genera1 good results. Clearly, marked incentives do stimulate the performance of LPT systems.
And fïnally, at the operutional leve1 we find that the presence of an integrated LPT system with different modalities tend to offer a better performance.
We may conclude that there is not a single, preponderant and unambiguous performance cause for LPT systems. Our cases demonstrate clearly that the success (or failure) has a multidimensional causality structure. This means that we have to investigate also the simultaneous occurrence of combinations of the four above mentioned critical success conditions. This wil1 be done in the next stage of our analysis.
In the second place, we wil1 now use a recently developed qualitative classification method, viz.
rough set analysis, to extract new insights from the nomina1 data in Table 3 . We have a data base of 22 cases (i.e., cities) each characterised by a performance indicator (or nomina1 value of a success indicator). Furthermore, the discriminatory score of this performance indicator is 'explained' by the nomina1 values of the CSCs in our codified table, subdivided into four main categories (extemal, strategie, tactical and operational). Each of these categories is subdivided into subcategories, so that altogether we have 18 explanatory factors. Thus, we have to explain the nomina1 expression for a success factor regarding the performance of LPT systems fì-om an underlying set of nomina1 expressions for CSCs. It is clear that, even apart from the smal1 sample of 22 cities, this is statistically an impossible task due to the low leve1 of measurement (i.e., nomina1 data).
Nevertheless, our codifïed information table may represent a latent structure through which the value of a performance indicator may yet be explained by means of combinatorial logie. In this context, the use of techniques from artifïcial intelligente, in particular rough set analysis, may be helpful. Rough set methods are multivariate classification methods that aim to detect pattems in a data base, even in the case of low measurement scales (including nomina1 scales). They are not based on conventional statistics, but on the identifïcation of deterministic rules (or statements) that are supported by the data base at hand. We wil1 now present the conditional statements which emerge from the application of a rough set analysis to the above data base (using the ROSE software programme). This application of rough set methods leads to the following 7 decision rules, i.e. conditional statements which explain under which conditions (values of CSCs) a certain performance score is realized.
These results show that there is no core (i.e., a common factor in each of these decision rules), although the accuracy of the approximation in this set of rules appears to be high. Essentially there are many reducts that provide an optimal representation of this multivariate classification. Attributes with a relatively high frequency in these reducts appear to be A2, A3, B2, B4, Cl, D3 and D5, with the highest frequency for D5.
The various decision rules specifïed above can be interpreted in a straightforward way. Let US take as an example tule (vii), which states that a failure of a LPT system (i.e., P=3) may be the result of a combination of a fïnancial framework based on a net tost contract (i.e., C2=1) and a very low leve1 of integration within the LPT system concemed (i.e., D4=3).
These decision rules look rather complex, but can in various cases be interpreted in a straightforward way. For example, tule (i) claims that a successful LPT system may emerge when there is a specific, customized and non-overloaded regulartory regime and when the privileged position of LPT systems is so strong, that no public-private partnership is necessary. Similarly, tule (ii) stipulates that, with a fair density of LPT systems, such that no complementary support mechanisms in the form of public-private partnership are needed, the LPT system concemed tends to be successful. Another example concerns rule (iv) which states that a medium success of LPT systems may already be expected with an intensive effort regarding marketing and information. An example of a failing performance can be found in rule (vii) which claims that a combination of a financial constellation based on a net tost contract and a low integration leve1 of LPT systems tends to lead to a low success.
Concluding Remarks
The necessary rise in efficiency and service provision in LPT systems requires a drastic reform in the organsation of urban mass transit systems. Such a regulatory transformation needs a closer orientation towards market principles in which delivery of high quality service to paying customers forms a crucial objective. This regulatory reform should also respect the peculiarities of LPT systems, such as its public nature, the indivisibility of parts of the infrastructure and the high fixed costs.
Consequently, a shit? towards mainly limited forms of competition seems to be plausible.
In our study, the success conditions for LPT systems in 22 European cities have been investigated. It turns out that these critical success factors can be subdivided into four categories, viz.
external, strategie, tactical and operational. From these classes of conditions, in particular the strategie, tactical and operational factors appear to exert a major influence.
In general, the regulatory reform of public transport has created new challenges and also new opportunities for a more successful functioning of these systems. Our comparative analysis has demonstrated that in the past years -despite variation -many European cities have managed to organize their LPT systems in a more efficient and satisfactory way.
